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CHURCH-STATE CASES
JAMES E. SERRITELLA, ESQUIRE
I. PERFORMANCE OF COPYRIGHTED CHURCH MUSIC-
F.E.L. Publications, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop
The case of F.E.L. Publications v. Catholic Bishop,' which involves
copyright law, is of special interest. F.E.L. Publications is a religious mu-
sic publisher which sells licenses to copy its songs.' It brought suit against
the Catholic Bishop of Chicago, alleging that the parishes in the Archdio-
cese of Chicago, without obtaining the required license, made copies of
songs that F.E.L. published, incorporated those copies into homemade
hymnals in churches, and sang the songs during services.3 Both F.E.L.
and the Catholic Bishop of Chicago filed motions for summary judgment
in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
The court denied F.E.L.'s motion for summary judgment and granted the
Catholic Bishop's motion, holding that F.E.L. had misused its copyright
and had unclean hands.'
Our misuse defense focused on F.E.L.'s license; and, therefore, it is
important to understand how it operates. F.E.L. possesses rights to about
a dozen popular songs, and, subject to a few exceptions that are irrele-
vant, F.E.L. only permits a potential customer to license all of its 1400
songs. This means that to get permission to copy those dozen widely used
songs, a licensee must buy a license to copy all of F.E.L.'s songs. The
506 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
Id. at 1130.
Id. at 1129. Prior to 1963 and the Second Vatican Council, songs were not sung by the
congregation in Catholic ceremonies. Hence, the market for hymnals did not exist. Id. Sub-
sequent to the Council, corporations such as F.E.L. arose to fulfill the Catholic Church's
need for songbooks. Id. at 1129-30. F.E.L. initiated a new marketing technique in 1972
whereby a prospective licensee would pay an annual rate of $100 to use all of F.E.L.'s listed
songs. Id. at 1130-31. At the end of the year, the copies of the songs must be destroyed or
the purchaser must pay another $100 fee. Id.
I Id. at 1137. The court noted that F.E.L.'s marketing technique was an unlawful extension
of its copyright monopoly since it sought to license the nonprofit performance of religious
songs for worship. Id. at 1134. Also, in establishing an all-or-nothing blanket license, F.E.L.
formed tying contracts that are illegal per se under the Sherman Act. Id. at 1136. Therefore,
F.E.L.'s "unclean hands" deprived the corporation of its right to an equitable remedy. Id. at
1137.
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second significant feature of the license is that it only grants permission
to copy the songs for a year. Thus, 1 year after the licensee buys the
license, the permission expires and he has to destroy the copies, even if he
has incorporated them into a hymnal. Because we do the legal work for a
large portion of the media and the press in the Midwest, we have seen
many copying licenses, and these features seemed most peculiar.
After analyzing this license, two defenses were clear. One was that
the all-or-nothing provision constituted an illegal tying arrangement
under the federal antitrust statutes. This is similar to the situation in the
motion picture industry when the studio required a theater or a theater
chain to buy all of its movies rather than marketing them on an individ-
ual basis. The United States Supreme Court held that this block-booking
was an illegal tying arrangement.5 Similarly, we raised the defense in our
case that F.E.L.'s license was an illegal tying arrangement.' The court
granted us summary judgment on that ground.7
Additionally, the court's grant of summary judgment was founded
upon a second ground, that F.E.L.'s requirement that the licensee destroy
the copies after 1 year means it is not really licensing the copying, but the
use of F.E.L.'s music.8 Since F.E.L. requires the licensee to destroy the
copies after a year, what it is really licensing is how long the licensee can
use those copies.' Under the copyright laws, while the copyright holder
can license for-profit performances, such as those in a theater or a night-
club, the holder nevertheless does not have the right to license not-for-
profit performances, including those in a church. Because of the insertion
of this destruction clause in the F.E.L. license, the court held that F.E.L.
illegally extended its copyright monopoly.10
Thus, the court found two misuses upon which to grant summary
judgment. One was the block-booking. The second was the extension of
the copyright monopoly to include the licensing of not-for-profit perform-
ances. The case is on appeal to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. The
Catholic Bishop also has a counterclaim pending against F.E.L. for dam-
ages as a result of F.E.L.'s violation of the antitrust laws. The district
court has not yet addressed that counterclaim and will not do so until the
' United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 48-49 (1962).
6 506 F. Supp. at 1134-36.
Id. at 1136.
' The court concluded that F.E.L.'s marketing technique was "simply a means by which it
licensed the not-for-profit religious performances of its copyrighted works; it is an extension
of its copyright monopoly not authorized by the copyright laws." Id. at 1134.
* A copyright owner cannot increase the scope of his monopoly afforded by his copyright
through a license agreement with the licensee. Id.; see Krampe v. Ideal Indus., Inc., 347 F.
Supp. 1384, 1386 (N.D. II. 1972).
10 506 F. Supp. at 1134. See also 2 M. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT § 8:15(A) (1982).
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appeal on those two defenses is resolved."
There are other defenses pending in this case. Perhaps the strongest
defense is that of laches." When the English Liturgy first came into exis-
tence 15 years ago, publishers were glad to get their own songs and their
own music distributed as widely as possible-nobody was holding anyone
to the legalities. After functioning in this manner for 10 years, F.E.L.
wanted to change the rules and hold everybody to the formalities. I think
that the laches defense may be one of our strongest defenses. Since it is
not the subject of the summary judgment motions, it is available to us if
the Seventh Circuit reverses.
Two brief points are worth noting. First, the case is still pending.
Second, the victory is not an excuse to begin violating the copyright laws.
The copyright laws exist and the F.E.L. lawsuit has made everybody
aware of them. There will be more suits if the copyright laws are dis-
obeyed. It is, therefore, very important to set up procedures in your own
dioceses to make sure they are obeyed. Copyright laws are especially im-
portant for Catholics, because, unlike most mainline Protestant denomi-
nations, Catholics do not have a national hymnal. They have to put to-
gether their own hymnals. When doing so, they should observe the
formalities so as to avoid further lawsuits.
II. "POLITICAL ENTANGLEMENT" UNDER THE CETA PROGRAM-
Decker v. United States Department of Labor
The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) is a fed-
eral job training program for the very poor.' s It is hoped that by receiving
training under the CETA program, the poor will be able to obtain normal
employment. The program operates through prime sponsors, which gener-
ally are cities, municipalities, and subcontractors. The latter are the reli-
gious denominations and various not-for-profit groups.
The specific type of CETA program involved in Decker v. United
States Department of Labor4 was title IID.1s This program involves both
employees who teach-custodial child care workers, summer education
" The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, sustaining the
copyright use defense, and dismissed F.E.L.'s suit in its entirety. 506 F. Supp. at 1139.
" Laches is an' ancient equitable defense analogous to estoppel. See Larson v. Crescent
Planning Mill, 218 S.W.2d 814, 821 (Mo. Ct. App. 1949). Since F.E.L. waited 10 years to
institute the controversial marketing technique, it may be argued that to hold in favor of
F.E.L. is prejudicial to the defendant. F.E.L.'s unreasonable delay in asserting its copyright
claim would work an unfair disadvantage to the defendant.
, See 29 U.S.C. § 841 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
" 473 F. Supp. 770 (E.D. Wis. 1979), affd sub nom. Decker v. O'Donnell, 661 F.2d 598 (7th
Cir. 1980).
" 29 U.S.C. §§ 853-859 (Supp. IV 1980).
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and recreation teachers, remedial education teachers, and tutors-and
other types of employees who do not teach, such as cafeteria workers and
safety-related school transportation employees. The suit was brought
against Milwaukee's program which was very small. In fact, some think
that the ACLU picked Milwaukee because its small program was seen as
vulnerable. In Decker, Judge Reynolds held that the portion of the pro-
gram that placed these CETA employees in parochial or church-related
schools was unconstitutional. 6 A nationwide injunction was issued to pro-
hibit the government and the various prime contractors from placing
CETA workers in parochial schools.' 7
The decision of the district court was affirmed by the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals. 8 The affirmance echoes notions we have heard for a
long time in the parochial aid cases. These cases state that since the
schools have a religious environment, the government must scrutinize any
publicly funded personnel in parochial schools to insure that they do not
advocate or proselytize. 0 Such scrutiny, however, constitutes entangle-
ment which is unconstitutional.'
The more significant doctrinal result of the case is the court's holding
that parochial schools cannot even use those workers that are not in sen-
sitive religious areas." The court reasoned that although these workers
create no administrative entanglement, they do create political entangle-
ment.2' This type of entanglement occurs because various faith groups
compete for more workers, more positions, and bigger contracts. The
court concluded that the resulting political divisiveness was unconstitu-
tional.23 Somewhere along the line this false doctrine must be effectively
debunked.
The Milwaukee Diocese which was denied a hearing, currently is con-
sidering whether or not to pursue the action. There is no incentive for
doing so since the CETA program is winding down. Moreover, the govern-
ment has specifically announced that it will discontinue title IID of the
CETA program, which was the target of this case.
There are three significant features of Decker. First, it not only
shows that the courts are continuing to use the reasoning found in prior
parochial decisions, but also goes beyond the bounds of parochial aid
since CETA is not a parochial aid program. Second, the case extends the
11 473 F. Supp. at 776.
17 Id. at 779.
Is 661 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1980).
'9 See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 366, 369-72 (1975); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602, 618-19 (1970).
" See 403 U.S. at 620.




doctrine of political entanglement further than ever before. Third, and
least important, is the court's holding that the part of the CETA program
relating to parochial schools is unconstitutional. This portion of the case
is practically moot, as those of you who have CETA programs already
know. The real problems with title IID of CETA now involve the winding
down of the program and the payment of unemployment compensation.
Nevertheless, the first two significant features of the case may have
ramifications in cases which do not involve CETA.
III. CHURCH PROPERTY-
Protestant Episcopal Church v. Barker
Litigation over church property is exemplified by Protestant Episco-
pal Church v. Barker,24 in which several local congregations, intending to
break away from the mother church, petitioned the court to decide who
was entitled to the church property. 5 A court may resolve this issue in
two ways. One way is to premise the determination upon the church's
polity. For example, if the polity is hierarchical, a court can let the hierar-
chical body make the decision as to who gets the property. If the polity is
congregational, a court can let the congregation decide. The second
method is to use the neutral principles of law approach. The court looks
at the deed, and other documents involved. If the documents give the
property to the hierarchical body, the court will give it to the hierarchical
body. If the documents give it to the congregation, the court will give it to
the congregation.
In the Barker case, the California court used the neutral principles of
law approach . 6 The court found that, although the Protestant Episcopal
Church might be hierarchical, there was nothing in the title papers or the
articles of incorporation of three of the four Protestant Episcopal congre-
gations that gave title of the property to the Episcopal Diocese.27 The
articles of incorporation for the fourth congregation indicated that the
congregation held the property subject to an express trust in favor of the
Diocese.28 The court, therefore, gave only the property of the fourth con-
gregation to the Diocese.'9 The critical factors in the court's determina-
tion were the contents of the articles of incorporation of the various local
churches and the legal title to the property.8 0
1, 115 Cal. App. 3d 599, 171 Cal. Rptr. 541 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 523 (1981).
'6 Id. at 605, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 543.
£6 Id. at 616, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 549.
17 Id. at 626, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 555.
28 Id. at 626-27, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 555-56.
£9 See id. at 627, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 556.
30 See id. at 622-25, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 553-55.
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The same type of situation was presented in Diocese of New Jersey
v. Graves.s" There, however, the New Jersey Supreme Court followed the
polity approach. The court held that since the Episcopal Church is hier-
archical, it was proper for the church body to determine which entity was
rightfully entitled to the property. 2 The court added that even if it were
to follow the neutral principles of law approach, it would reach the identi-
cal result because both a state statute and the church canons stated that
the hierarchical body had the right to approve transfers by a local church
congregation.3 3  Similarly, in Marich v. Kragulac," a local congregation
broke away from the Serbian Orthodox Church. 5 The Indiana court de-
cided that it would use the polity approach and remanded the case to
trial.3 The district court was instructed that if the trial court found that
the polity was hierarchical, then it had to give the church hierarchy the
property. Alternatively, if it found that the polity was congregational, it
had to give the congregation the property.
The significant thing about these cases is that almost all of them
have dissents.37 When faced with the issue, the courts seem to prefer the
neutral principles of law approach, as opposed to the polity method. This
preference occurs because the polity method requires more analysis. For
example, it is unclear whether certain denominations are hierarchical or
congregational.
This judicial preference should be of some concern to Catholic law-
yers. We have always assumed, at least until Jones v. Wolf" was decided,
that these cases would be decided on the basis of the polity test. Due to
this assumption, we have not paid a great deal of attention to who has
title to church property. The court's use of the neutral principles of law
approach indicates that we should check our title documents to make
sure that they reflect who is to get the property if a title contest ever
arises.
Reviewing title documents is particularly important because of the
profusion of cases involving the Catholic Church. There are twenty-two
different contentious situations across the country involving Catholic
church property. They tend to be situations in which the bishop has de-
83 N.J. 572, 417 A.2d 19 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1131 (1981).
8' 83 N.J. at 580, 417 A.2d at 24.
See id. at 580-81, 417 A.2d at 24.
34 415 N.E.2d 91 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
Id. at 93.
"Id. at 100.
See Protestant Episcopal Church v. Barker, 115 Cal. App. 3d 599, 627, 171 Cal. Rptr. 541,
556 (Roth, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 323 (1981); Diocese of New Jersey v.
Graves, 83 N.J. 572, 582, 417 A.2d 24, 34 (1980) (Schreiber, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1131 (1981).
38 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
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cided to close a church, to alter the internal architecture of the church to
conform with the new requirements of the liturgy, or to merge schools.
Some of these situations have gotten into court. It is, therefore, a good
idea to check the document before a problem develops.
One of the cases that has gotten into court is Galich v. Catholic
Bishop of Chicago.39 There, the bishop decided to close a local church
because the cost of supporting it was too great.4 The building was in a
dilapidated state, and there were many other very strong functioning
churches in the area, as well as a shortage of priests.41 Certain members
of the local congregation filed a lawsuit and tried to get the courts to
require the bishop to keep the church open.42 They alleged that there was
both an implied and express trust in favor of the local congregation.'3
The court eventually decided the case based on the polity analysis." It
held that since this was a hierarchical church, the bishop was the proper
person to make the decision."5 The court, however, also used the neutral
principles of law test,4 but nevertheless found that the bishop had title
to the property. 47 This case demonstrates the importance of sound
documents.
In addition to court proceedings, church property disputes are often
accompanied by landmark proceedings. When those who want to save a
church lose in court, they usually go to the various landmark bodies. With
respect to the Catholic Church, this means that there will probably be a
landmark hearing where the property documents are properly organized.
Those who want to keep the Catholic church open believe that if the.
landmark body designates the church as a landmark and thereby pre-
vents the church hierarchy from demolishing the building, the hierarchy
will appoint a priest to keep the church going.
Our dealings with local, state, and national landmark bodies reveal
that there are three valid arguments against those seeking to impose
landmark status. First, such status is not desirable from the perspective
of the property owner. This is especially important in the federal forum.
Second, there are constitutional problems with the designation of a
church as a landmark. Landmark designation alters the church body's
control over the disposition of the church because it often prevents the
church from demolishing the building. The designation, however, does
39 75 Ill. App. 3d 538, 394 N.E.2d 572 (Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 916 (1980).
11 75 Ill. App. 3d at 540, 394 N.E.2d at 574.
41 Id.
42 See id. at 540-41, 394 N.E.2d at 574.
43 Id. at 541, 394 N.E.2d at 574.
14 Id. at 548, 394 N.E.2d at 579.
45 Id.
41 Id. at 542-45, 394 N.E.2d at 575-77.
4* Id. at 545, 394 N.E.2d at 577.
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not save the church, one of the principle ends sought by proponents of
landmark status. The landmark body cannot force the hierarchy to use
the building as a church. Therefore, landmark designation simply ties up
the hierarchy. Third, the church does not meet the landmark require-
ments. Usually, the claims for landmark status are rather frivolous. The
proponents state that this is a French church, or an Italian church, or a
Polish church, or an Irish church. Since most Catholics are from some
ethnic group, most churches originally had some ethnic association. It is
quite difficult to distinguish one church from another on that basis. If one
church is going to be designated a landmark, virtually all churches are
going to be designated landmarks. To qualify as a landmark, there must
be something historically or architecturally significant about a given
church body.
